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Introduction
We develop a partial equilibrium model in which firms each period have the choice to locate in one of two separate regions, labeled region A and region B, and sell their products in that region.
A firm's decision in which region to locate in a given period depends on the regions' relative profitability. Since firms only have a limited understanding of their economic environment, they try to identify the regions' relative profitability from their own past experience and by observing the past success of other firms. If firms react only weakly to the regions' relative past profitability, the model's dynamics is stable and global welfare is maximized. Welfare reducing fluctuations are set in motion, though, if firms react strongly to the regions' relative past profitability. The firms' location then leads to price and quantity fluctuations which are harmful for consumer surplus and firms' profits. Against this background, we explore whether policy makers are able to stabilize markets by imposing profit taxes. Moreover, we analyze the welfare effects of such tax policies in order to investigate whether it is optimal for policy makers to indeed stabilize markets. Surprisingly, we find that market stability can already be established if a sufficiently high profit tax is implemented in one of the two regions. However, global welfare is only maximized if policy makers of region A and region B coordinate their tax setting behavior. The explanation for this may be summarized as follows. Policy makers are able to stabilize the dynamics in both cases since profit taxes manage to reduce the regions' relative past profitability and thereby slow down the firms' market switching behavior. The disadvantage of unilaterally imposed profit taxes is that they distort the optimal distribution of firms across markets with firms relocating to the region with lower taxes. The advantage of a bilateral tax policy is that it allows for a reduction in the regions' relative past profitability in such a way that the optimal distribution of firms remains preserved. However, policy makers may have an incentive to deviate from a coordinated tax 3 policy. Starting from a situation in which globally optimal profit taxes are implemented in both regions, policy makers in one of the regions may try to improve local welfare by reducing profit taxes in their region. While this may compromise stability, the low-tax region attracts firms from the high-tax region which may outweigh the cost it suffers from instability.
Our paper is part of a recent stream of literature which investigates the dynamics of market interactions and policy tools to control them. Westerhoff (2009, 2010) develop interacting cobweb market models and find that such systems tend to be more prone to instability than isolated cobweb markets. Since their cobweb approach entails a supply-response lag, the properties of their models depend on a four-dimensional nonlinear map. The dynamics of our model depend on a one-dimensional nonlinear map which enables us to offer an in-depth stability and welfare analysis. Brock and Hommes (1997) consider a single cobweb market in which firms switch between stabilizing and destabilizing expectation rules. One of their seminal insights is that endogenous dynamics may emerge if firms react strongly to the expectation rules' past performance differentials. Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015, 2016) show that policy makers have the opportunity to stabilize such dynamics by imposing profit taxes. Here we show that the basic mechanism at work within these models may carry over to frameworks with multiple regions. Tuinstra et al. (2014) develop a cobweb-type model with two regions to study the stability and welfare effects of trade barriers. Firms from one of the two regions can offer their products in both regions, while firms from the other region have a cost disadvantage which forces them to supply their products only in their own market. As it turns out, free trade may lead to price and quantity fluctuations and thereby hamper welfare. Moreover, trade barriers, modeled in the form of import tariffs, may stabilize such dynamics and thus have -contrary to conventional wisdompositive welfare effects. A similar result is demonstrated by Commendatore and Kubin (2009): while increasing labor and product market flexibility may increase employment, a deregulated 4 economy may be subject to welfare-reducing fluctuations. Schmitt et al. (2017) consider a model in which firms have the opportunity to enter a competitive market and make an uncertain profit or to obtain a constant profit from a safe outside option. We extend that model by endogenizing the safe outside option, i.e. we allow firms to switch between two risky markets. While the main goal of Schmitt et al. (2017) is to show that profit taxes may give rise to unexpected dynamic phenomena such as hysteresis effects, our focus is on stability and welfare effects of profit taxes.
Our paper is also related to another stream of literature that models market interactions using a New Economic Geography perspective. The models by Agliari et al. (2011 Agliari et al. ( , 2014 and Commendatore et al. (2014 Commendatore et al. ( , 2015 reveal that market interactions between multiple economic regions may lead to complex endogenous dynamics. These papers furthermore demonstrate that policy makers have tools to stabilize the fluctuations of these markets, such as increasing trade costs. Particularly relevant is Commendatore et al. (2008) . They show that a small increase in the difference in taxes (or subsidies) between regions may lead to radical changes in both the dynamics and the spatial distribution of manufacturers in the Footloose Entrepreneurs model. The beauty of these contributions lies in their elaborate modeling of the economic environments of different regions. Unfortunately, the analysis of these models may be quite cumbersome. Our simple model may be regarded as a helpful complementary model to understand the basic destabilizing forces of market interactions and to identify key stability and welfare effects of profit taxes. We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we propose our model. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze the stability properties of our model, and the welfare effects of profit taxes, respectively.
In Section 5, we conclude our paper.
A simple market interaction model
We consider a partial equilibrium model with two regions, A and B. In both regions the same homogenous commodity is produced by firms that may relocate between the regions, and , the optimal commodity demand is
The optimal demand for the composite commodity then is given by
. In a similar way we can derive the commodity demand in region B as
We consider a fixed number N of identical firms and assume that half of the firms are owned by the households from region A while the other half are owned by the households from region B. For simplicity, we normalize the total number of firms to profit by relocating to the other region, and this equilibrium allocation will be maintained forever.
However, even in our highly stylized model, this requires solving a complex coordination problem on the part of the firms, which becomes even more demanding if the equilibrium is sometimes disrupted by exogenous shocks, such as a change in demand or costs. Moreover, out of equilibrium it is very difficult for an individual firm to determine the optimal choice of region, since this requires predicting the location decisions of all other firms. We therefore take a behavioral approach and assume firms compare their own past profit experience with those of other firms and may choose to imitate the latter. The well-known replicator dynamics, originally introduced in evolutionary biology by Taylor and Jonker (1978) , also see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) , can be derived from such an imitation process (see e.g. Gale et al. 1995 and Schlag 1998) .
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In this paper, we use the exponential replicator dynamics, as introduced by Hofbauer and Weibull (1996 (
Despite involving market interactions between two regions, the dynamics of our model only stem from a one-dimensional nonlinear map with three parameters: the firms' intensity of choice and the two profit tax rates set by the policy makers of regions A and B. Note that the difference in profits,
A t B t π π − , is increasing in t n . Moreover, if the difference in taxes is large enough this profit difference will be positive (negative) for every value of ( )
and all firms will locate in 2 An advantage of the replicator dynamics over other evolutionary models, such as the discrete choice model pioneered by Brock and Hommes (1997) , is that the economic equilibrium of the model (the value of t n for which profits in the different regions are equal) coincides with the fixed point of the replicator dynamics. The exponential replicator dynamics has the added advantage that it is still valid if profits become negative and that it has a parameter, β , which controls for the sensitivity with respect to profit differentials (i.e. the strength of the imitation process). Dindo and Tuinstra (2011) derive the exponential replicator dynamics from a model of imitation. Other economic applications of exponential replicator dynamics include, amongst others, Kopel et al. (2014) , Tuinstra et al. (2014) , Bischi et al. (2015) and Schmitt et al. (2017) .
the same region. Such a scenario is of limited economic interest. Moreover, policy makers of the region without any firms will have a strong incentive to attract firms by lowering the tax rate. In the remainder of this paper we therefore restrict our attention to tax rates ( 2) 3 The steady state equilibrium and its stability properties
We start with an analysis of the steady states of the model and their stability properties, which is summarized by the following result.
Proposition. Assume the tax rates satisfy condition (2). Then the economic model (1) has three
steady states, 
Proof. The three steady states can be found by solving ( ) n n f = for n . For local asymptotic stability of steady state n we need to determine
, where the inequalities follow from the fact that
is equivalent with (2).■ From an economic perspective, the outer steady states 1 n and 3 n imply that either all firms leave or enter region A. As long as condition (2) holds, these steady states will be unstable. The inner steady state 2 n is economically more interesting and equalizes profitability between the two regions.
If tax rates are equal, B A τ τ = , the model is fully symmetric and in the inner steady state firms are split evenly between regions, as the following corollary to our proposition establishes.
Corollary. For
the inner steady state is 5 . 0 2 = n and the local stability condition (3) reduces to
In absence of profit taxes,
, the inner steady state is therefore given by
. Prices, aggregate quantities and profits will be equal across regions as well and given by . Since the slope of the map becomes steeper than 1 − at the inner steady state as β exceeds 13.5, we can furthermore conclude that the model's primary bifurcation is a perioddoubling bifurcation (this is also confirmed by numerical evidence presented in Section 4).
One advantage of our model is that it allows us to depict the effects of an increase in the intensity of choice, thereby enabling us to get a clear economic understanding of the origins of ) and that both markets are equally profitable at the inner steady state. Out of equilibrium, however, the profitability of region A deviates from the profitability of region B. This is important since the firms' market entry and exit behavior crucially depends on the regions' relative past profitability.
In particular, the higher the firms' intensity of choice, the stronger firms react to the regions' relative past profitability. It is exactly this reason why the slope of the map at the inner steady state becomes steeper as β increases, turning the model's inner steady state eventually unstable.
In the remainder of this section we investigate whether policy makers are able to stabilize the markets by imposing profit taxes on the firms located in their region. In Section 4 we will subsequently investigate whether, if possible, it is actually optimal for the policy makers to stabilize the markets. Let us first consider the case in which policy makers impose equal tax rates across regions, i.e.
. From the corollary we find that the local asymptotic stability condition of the inner steady state now reads
It is important to note that policy makers do not alter the model's inner steady state if they impose equal tax rates across regions. By imposing profit taxes, however, policy makers are able to stabilize markets. In particular, any destabilizing increase in the firms' intensity of choice can be offset by an appropriate increase in profit taxes. For example, if the firms' intensity of choice 11 doubles from 13.5 to 27, policy makers can restore stability by setting , and from the proposition we find that the inner steady state for this specification is , respectively. The profitability of region A and thus the number of firms located in region A decreases as the tax rate in region A increases. The stability of the inner steady state is again influenced by two channels: the regions' relative past profitability and the location of the inner steady state. As the tax rate in region A increases from 1 to 50 percent, the regions' relative profitability is hardly affected. But since fewer firms are located in region A, the inner steady state becomes unstable. However, if the tax rate in region A increases from 50 percent to 85 percent, the regions' relative profitability decreases. This has a stabilizing effect on the dynamics.
Moreover, the number of firms active in region A further declines, and this contributes to market stability (as discussed before).
Welfare effects of profit taxes
So far, our analysis reveals that policy makers have the opportunity to stabilize markets by imposing profit taxes. However, we have also seen that profit taxes may change the distribution of firms across markets. This raises some important questions, . The total profits of firms owned by households from region A depend on the profits these firms make in region A and in region B.
Recall that the total number of firms is normalized to 1 and that half of all firms are owned by households from region A, while the other half are owned by households from region B.
Moreover, the firms' total profits generated in region A and in region B are given by We are now able to derive a number of important policy insights. If policy makers do not impose profit taxes, the model's inner steady state is given by 5 . 0 2 = n . As long as the firms' intensity of choice is below 13.5, the model's inner steady state is stable and global welfare is maximized. If firms' intensity of choice exceeds 13.5, endogenous dynamics kick in and global welfare decreases. However, policy makers can always stabilize the dynamics by imposing a uniform profit tax across markets. Since such a tax policy does not distort the optimal distribution of firms, policy makers can always achieve the best possible global welfare level. show that the stabilizing role of a unilaterally imposed profit tax may be beneficial for region A.
Panel (e) portrays the global and local steady-state welfare effects for an increase in the profit tax rate in region A, assuming that region B imposes a rather high profit tax rate of 65 percent. It is clear from our analysis above that global welfare increases up to
and then decreases again. However, we also see that region A may improve its welfare by imposing a 18 moderate profit tax rate (while region B always benefits if firms in region A are subject to higher profit taxes). Despite suffering from a lower consumer surplus and lower firms' profits, panel (f)
of Figure 3 reveals that the reason why region A benefits from imposing a moderate profit tax rate is that it generates additional tax revenues.
We now study the out-of-equilibrium properties of our model. We start with contrasting the effects of an increase in the firms' intensity of choice versus an increase in a uniformly suggests that it is better for region A not to impose profit taxes. Although setting 0 = A τ triggers unstable dynamics, region A is better off since it attracts more firms. Finally, the properties of the deterministic dynamics depicted in Figure 6 are robust with respect to exogenous noise.
Conclusions
We present a partial equilibrium model in which firms can offer their products in two separate regions. The firms' decision whether to locate in a given trading period either in region A or in region B depends on the regions' relative past profitability. The higher a region's relative past profitability, the more firms it will attract. The dynamics of our model stem from a onedimensional nonlinear map. In addition to two unstable outer steady states in which all firms 22 locate either in region A or in region B, there is an inner steady state in which firms split evenly across regions. As long as firms react only weakly to the regions' relative past performance, the inner steady state is stable and global welfare is maximized. Welfare depressing endogenous dynamics emerge if firms react strongly to the regions' relative past performance. We use our model to study whether policy makers are able to stabilize these dynamics by imposing profit taxes and whether they can promote local and/or global welfare by doing so. One important insight is that policy makers can always maintain stable dynamics and maximize global welfare by coordinating their tax setting behavior. The advantage of a coordinated tax policy is that it does not distort the optimal distribution of firms across markets.
For political reasons, policy makers of one of the two regions, say region B, may not be able to implement profit taxes. Surprisingly, policy makers of region A can still achieve stable dynamics by imposing profit taxes in their own region. Unfortunately, a unilateral tax policy distorts the firms' optimal distribution across regions. Whether such a tax policy has positive or negative welfare effects depends on the trade-off between the optimal distribution of firms and market stability. Our analysis suggests that the chances that policy makers have to improve welfare depends on the tax rate they have to introduce to stabilize dynamics. If firms' intensity of choice is not too high, the beneficial stabilizing effect of a moderate tax rate may outweigh the welfare loss incurred by a non-optimal distribution of firms across regions. Our analysis further reveals that policy makers may have reasons to deviate from a coordinated tax policy. Suppose, for instance, that the profit tax rate that policy makers would need to impose to stabilize markets and to maximize global welfare is rather high. In such a situation, policy makers in one of the two regions may have an incentive to reduce profit taxes in their region: the welfare gain which arises from attracting more firms may outweigh the welfare loss which occurs from market instability.
We conclude by pointing out four avenues for future research. For simplicity, the model's 23 two regions are symmetric. A first natural extension of our model could be to consider two asymmetric regions, e.g. by assuming that demand for the commodity is different in the two regions. Moreover, our model highlights market interaction from a supply side. A second natural extension could be to add market interactions arising from the demand side. To keep our welfare analysis as simple as possible, we assume that the public sector offers a composite commodity at a price equal to its marginal costs. A third natural extension of our model could be to endogenize this background part of our model, i.e. to develop a general equilibrium model. Finally, profit taxes are exogenously fixed in our model. A fourth natural extension could be to allow policy makers to endogenously adjust profit taxes. To improve our understanding of the stability and welfare effects of profit taxes, we have refrained from these extensions so far. . The impact of additive normal distributed noise with mean zero and standard deviation 0.015 on these quantities is illustrated in gray.
